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THE REGULATION OF COMMON
INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS AS IT
RELATES TO POLITICAL EXPRESSION:
THE ARGUMENT FOR LIBERTY AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
INTRODUCTION

Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions,
constantlyform associations. They have not only commercial
and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but
associations of a thousand other kinds-religious, moral,
serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or
diminutive.
-Alexis de Tocqueville'
In 1962 there were five hundred homeowners

associations

("HOAs") in the United States.2 Thirty years later there were 150,000
1ALEXIS

DE TocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 472 (Bruce Frohnen ed., Henry

Reeve, C.B. trans., Regnery Gateway 2003) (1835).
2 SETHA Low, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN

FORTRESS AMERICA 177 (2003). In this Note the term "homeowners association," or "O,
will be used to refer to several different kinds of associations that are very similar (though not
identical in nature). See, e.g., Community Associations Institute, About Community
Associations, http://www.caionline.org/info/help/associations/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited
Mar. 17, 2009) (choosing to use the umbrella term "community association"). The term
residential private government, or "RPG," is also commonly used to refer to HOAs. Evan
McKenzie, The Dynamics of Privatopia: Private Residential Governance in the USA, in
PRIVATE CITIES: GLOBAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 9, 11 (Georg Glasze, Chris Webster &
Klaus Franz eds., 2006) [hereinafter McKenzie, Dynamics]. With condominiums the HOA is
generally called a "condominium association"; with stock cooperatives the residents form what
is usually simply called a "corporation." Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Flaws of Residential
Servitudes and Owners Associations: ForReformation not Termination, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 513,
513 n.4 (citing Curtis J. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM.
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HOAs with over 32 million residents.3 In 2008 there were 300,800
HOAs, containing 24.1 million housing units and 59.5 million
residents.4 It is quite evident that a large portion of American citizens,
approximately 20 percent, live in common interest developments
("CIDs") governed by some form of HOA.5
The private property controlled by HOAs is subject to many
different types of rules and regulations that are typically written into
the deeds of the property in the form of equitable servitudes, real
covenants that run with the land, and other contractual restrictions.6
These restrictions, which are various limitations on private land use,
generally are referred to in the real estate industry as "covenants,
contracts, and deed restrictions," or "CC&Rs." These restrictions do
not simply prescribe the color of one's front door, or even the shade
of the underside of the drapes visible from the street, but quite often
regulate behavior.8 Some of the more expansive restrictions imposed
by HOAs regulate political speech and expression. 9 Such restrictions
can take many forms. Some examples include banning political signs,
political gatherings in common areas, newspaper distribution, and

L. REv. 987 (1963) (regarding condominiums); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 339-d to 339-ii
(McKinney 1989) (regarding condominiums); Edwin Youman, Some Legal Aspects of
Cooperative Housing, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 126 (1947) (regarding stock cooperatives)).
3 Low, supra note 2, at 177.
4 Community Associations
Institute, Industry Data, http://www.caionline.org/inforesearch/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
5This figure is based on a population of 281,421,906, as counted in the 2000 national
census. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, United States Census 2000,
http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.htm1l (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). This percentage is
only an approximate figure used for illustrative purposes as the total population used was the
figure from the 2000 Census, and the ClID population was a 2008 figure. Also note the term
common interest community, or "CIC," is also commonly used to refer to CIDs. McKenzie,
Dynamics, supra note 2, at 11.
6 Korngold, supra note 2, at 513-14. The servitudes, which the property is subject to,
create the HOA. Id. at 513 (citing 5011 Cmty. Org. v. Harris, 548 A.2d 9 (Conn. App. Ct.
1988); Travis Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Small, 662 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)); see
also Low, supra note 2, at 176-77. See generally GERALD KoRNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE
ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 408-15,
418-24 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing background and general enforceability of covenants as they
relate to building, use, aesthetic, and architectural controls) [hereinafter KoRNOOLD, PRIVATE
LAND USE].
7 Low, supra note 2, at 19; see Community Association Institute, About Community
Associations, http://www.caionline.org/ info/help/associations/Pagesdefaultaspx (last visited
Mar. 8, 2009) (defining "CC&Rs" as "covenants, conditions and restrictions").
8Low, supra note 2, at 158. For example, the Chartwell community, near Philadelphia,
has a restriction banning all offensive conduct: "[any activity that is] 'noxious or offensive to
other home lot owners. "' EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 17 (1994) (citing Marie McCullough, It 's a
Swing Set! There Goes the Neighborhood, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 9, 199 1, at 1). In response,
"[olne homeowner asked, 'Who are these little Hidlers making these rules?"' Id.
9MCKENZIE, supranote 8, at 15.
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leafleting.' 0 In many CIDs the limitations imposed by the CC&Rs
could even be viewed as a blanket restriction on the historical forms
of political expression.
Many have complained that the severe restriction imposed by
CC&Rs on political expression amounts to a severe erosion of
expression rights, including First Amendment rights, for millions of
Americans."' One need only compare the restrictions put on life
outside a CID with those sometimes placed on life inside to see the
possibility of that conclusion.'12 Political speech is often regarded as
the most protected and significant form of free expression.'13 This has
led some to the conclusion that HOAs should be treated as
municipalities, or the functional equivalent of municipalities, and held
to a similar constitutional standard.'14 However, this conclusion seems
wholly inappropriate when one takes into account the classically
liberal values surrounding the paramount place that private property,

10Id. (citing Laguna PubI'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found, of Laguna Hills, 182 Cal. Rptr.
813 (Ct. App. 1982); RICHARD Louv, AMERICA 11 128 (1983); Ralph C. Meyer, The
Dictatorship Syndrome (1977) (paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the
Community Associations Institute)).
1See, e.g., Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed. Common Interest
Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE &
ENVTrL. L. 233,264 (2006).
12 Despite the fact that municipalities have the ability to enforce certain restrictions on
forms of communication through their police powers, blanket or near-blanket restrictions violate
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43
(1994). In City of Ladue v. Gilleo the City of Ladue banned all signs that did not fall within any
often exceptions. Id at 46. The Court held that the restrictions violated the free speech rights of
the residents of Ladue. Mdat 58. Although signs pose unique problems that are subject to the
police powers of municipalities, such as visual clutter, the Court found that Ladue "completely
foreclosed a venerable means of conmmunication . . . . [of] political, religious, or personal
messages." Id. at 54. Further, the attempt to impose "time, place, or manner" restrictions was
too restrictive because alternatives such as handbills and newspaper advertisements were
inadequate substitutes for the "important medium of speech that Ladue has closed off." Id. at 56;
see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited the display of flags, signs, and placards of a political nature in a public forum-on
the sidewalk in front of the United States Supreme Court building (of all places)--because it
was not a reasonable restriction regarding time, place, and manner of speech).
13 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Right to Reject: The First Amendment in a
Media-Drenched Society, 42 SAN DtEGo L. REv. 129, 176 (2005). See generally Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1946) (lead case imposing constitutional restrictions on a
private entity through "state action" because of its functional equivalence to a government).
However, it should be noted that thi "most sacred" type of speech may be becoming less so.
Garry, supra, at 176; see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (both
upholding and striking down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
14 See, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 122-24; Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 234-35;
David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated
Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 763, 778-79 (1995); Lama Womack &
Douglas Timmons, Homeowner Associations: Are They Private Governments?, 29 REAL EST.
L.J. 322, 322-23 (2001); see also Ladue, 512 U.S. 43 (holding that a municipality's restrictions
on political speech ran afoul of the Free Speech Clause). HOAs that govern CIDs can be treated
as subject to constitutional restrictions on government through the doctrine of state action. See
Marsh, 326 U.S. 501.
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and the regulation thereof, has historically held in the development of
our republic and jurisprudence. 15 Furthermore, the choices and
rational expectations of individuals combined with the benefits and
economic efficiency of CIDs point to the continued private ordering
of HOAs.' 6
This Note will focus on the restriction on political expression in
CIDs in light of the Anglo-American normative notions surrounding
private property rights, as well as the economic efficiency and market
realities of CIDs. 17 With this understanding, it is my contention that
the predominant view of HOAs as private arrangements, governed by
private law, should be maintained when considering efforts to have
HOAs regulated by public law or treated as the functional equivalents
of municipalities through a constitutional framework. 18
I. THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AND THE COMMON INTEREST
DEVELOPMENT

There are four general types of CIDs: condominiums, stock
cooperatives, community apartments, and "planned developments,"
which are most often associated with "gated comm-runities." 9 Stock
15 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the importance of private property
rights in America); see also TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN 21ST-CENTuRY AMERICA 1-2, 10 (2006); John Locke, The Second Treatise of
Government, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 17, §§ 26, 27, 32, at 2831 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2005).
16 See Korngold, supra note 2, at 516-19 (discussing economic efficiency, contract rights,
and personal choice). See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS
(4th ed. 2004) (providing an analysis of economics applied to law (and vice versa) and a basic
explanation of microeconomic theory).
17 While the rule of law is paramount, we cannot lose sight of the factors that shape, and
have shaped, our legal doctrine. This Note in no way advocates disregarding the law as it is
written in favor of extrinsic normative notions. In fact, the normative considerations contained
herein have historical applicability to the founding of our republic and our jurisprudence when
originally founded and developed.
18 See generally Marsh, 326 U.S. 501 (treating a corporation that owned and ran
"company town" as a state actor); Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 247-48 (discussing Marsh v.
Alabama state action doctrine as applied to HOAs). "Public law" is being used here to refer to
laws, primarily constitutional but also common and statutory, that are designed to regulate
governments, or private conduct through governments. Please note that political expression on
public property, or in legitimate public forums, is a completely different subject. The Author in
no way argues for the curtailment of political expression in true, legitimate, public forums. See
generally Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 754-63 (Cal. 2007) (Chin, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing the importance of expression in legitimate public forums and arguing
for the court to overrule Robins v. PruneyardShopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), off d 447
U.S. 74 (1980), despite the majority's re-affirmation of the holding in Pruneyard case), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 94 (2008); SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1212,
1214 n.5 (N.Y. 1985) (rejecting California Supreme Court opinion in Pruneyard).
19MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 126; McKenzie, Dynamics, supra note 2, at 11. These are
terms that are commonly used in the real estate industry. As a legal matter, the key issue is that
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cooperatives, or "co-ops," are commonly-owned buildings in which
owners buy shares that entitle them to possession of one residential
unit as well as the use of common areas.2 In condominiums and
planned developments, residents own fee title to their units and have
common ownership of their community's common areas . 2 ' The only
general difference between the two is that planned developments
often contain single-family homes, and condominiums usually are
comprised of multi-family or conjoined homes.2
However, this is only a generalization, as there are many different
types of living arrangements, structures, and styles of condominiums
and planned developments. The Community Associations Institute
provides a tidy general definition of CIDs:
Three features make community association homes different
from traditional forms of homeownership. One is that you
share ownership of common land and have access to facilities
such as swimming pools that often are not affordable any
other way. The second is that you automatically become a
member of a community association and typically must abide
by covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The third
feature is that you will pay an "assessment" (a regular fee,
often monthly, that is used for upkeep of the common areas
and other services and amenities).2
The definition offered by Evan McKenzie, the author of
Privatopia, has a slightly different tone: CIDs share the features of
"common ownership of property, mandatory membership in the
homeowners association, and the requirement of living under a
private regime of restrictive covenants enforced by fellow
residents. ,4Nonetheless, the ownership characteristics of CIDs

there is some form of common ownership, which depends on the structure of the CID and
applies to certain areas within a development that are governed by an HOA or similar
organization. See id. at 11-14.
20 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 127; see also McKenzie, Dynamics, supra note 2, at 11-14.
21 See Low, supra note 2, at 182; McKenzie, Dynamics, supra note 2, at 11-12.
22 See MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 19; McKenzie, Dynamics, supra note 2, at 12-14.
23 Community
Associations
institute,
About
Community
Associations,
http://www.caionline.org/info/help/associations/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
The Community Associations Institute is a national industry association, comprised of HOA
board members and professional HOA managers and management firmns, that promotes
"fostering vibrant, competent, harmonious community associations," as well as advocating "for
legislative and regulatory policies that support responsible governance and effective
management." Community Associations Institute, Who We Are, http://www.caionline.orgaboutfwho/Pagesldefault.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
24 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 19. Depending on the agreed to situation, sometimes only
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include the common ownership of a CID' s common areas and
individual possession and ownership of some form of residential

unit. 25

The common areas of a CID can be quite expansive, including not
only those things usually associated with common areas, like pools
and community rooms in a "club house," but also structures like the
walls and roofs of condominiums and cooperatives, or the streets,
sidewalks, and sewers of planned developments.2 Further, commonly
owned property of a CID may also provide services to the residents,
such as television stations, security forces, and bus routes .27 The last
general feature of a CID--one that is quite important-is that
membership in the HOA is required of all CID residents.2
The HOA, sometimes referred to as a "private government," is the
organization that collects fees for the administration and upkeep of
the common areas (in some cases holding fee title to the common
areas), and maintains and enforces the CC&Rs . 29 HWAS are generally
"mutual-benefit corporations" or some other type of non-profit
corporation created by a CID's real estate developer .3 0 The

the HOA can enforce infractions. KORNOOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE, supra note 6, at 43 1-32.
25 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 19. "[The servitude schemes (CC&Rs)] may also grant
reciprocal rights in common facilities serving the development, such as parks, roads, utilities
and recreational amenities ...
"Korngold, supra note 2, at 513 (citing Maddox v. Katzman,
332 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Beech Mountain Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 269
S.E.2d 178 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)). However, the right to possession and 'quiet enjoyment' of
one's unit is not always absolute, as agents of some HOAs are permitted to enter homes to
protect the common investment. MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 142.
26 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 129. In fact, with condominiums, the resident owner only
has fee title to the air-space and interior finished walls of his unit; the rest of the structure and
the grounds around it are owned in common. McKenzie, Dynamics, supra note 2, at 12.
"Ownership" of a condominium is really more like a permanent right to occupy the residential
unit. id
27 MARTHA DERTHICK, KEEPING THlE COMPOUND REPUBLIC: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN

FE~DERsALISM 30-31 (2001); Korngold, supra note 2, at 514 (stating that HOAs may provide
services such as rubbish collection and security).
28 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 127.
29 Korngold, supra note 2, at 5 13-14 (citing Perry v. Bridgetown Cmtry. Ass'n, 486 So.2d
1230 (Miss. 1986) (regarding subdivision dues); Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 666 P.2d
1247 (Mont. 1983) (HOA's rules and regulations power); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates
Prop. Owners Ass'n, 367 S.E.2d 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (HOA's power to approve building
plans), affid, 375 S.E.2d 905 (N.C. 1989); Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938) (HOA administering common areas); Garrison
Apartments, Inc. v. Sabourin, 449 N.Y.S.2d 629 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (regarding providing
security)); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 129; Fred E. Foldvary, The Economic Casefor
PrivateResidential Government, in PRIVATE CITIES: GLOBAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 2, at 31, 42. See generally KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE, supra note 6, at 424 (regarding
the power of HOAs).
30 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 20, 142. The HOA is generally set up through a scheme of
servitudes. Korngold, supra note 2, at 513 (citing Uriel Reichman, Residential Private
Governments: An Introductory Survery, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976)).
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developer generally has control over the drafting of the certificate of
incorporation and by-laws; consequently, the developer has control
over the CC&Rs that govern what type of community a CID will be,
such as a seniors-only community, or a community that prohibits pets
or renters .3 '1 Essentially, since the CC&Rs are generally equitable
servitudes, real covenants that run with the land, and other restrictions
that the HOAs maintain, when residential units are sold, the buyer is
also bound by the same restrictions as the seller.3 Originally, these
restrictions applied to a somewhat limited realm, such as restricting
structures to single-family homes or prohibiting slaughterhouses and
noisome factories on the property.3 Today, however, the CC&Rs in
CIDs set specific standards and can restrict anything from the
condition of the unit and the number and age of occupants to the
lifestyle of the residents, such as forbidding the operation of
businesses from units.3
Most relevant to this Note, HOAs enforce and create CC&Rs
dealing with political expression . 35 Generally, again, this includes
banning political signs, political gatherings in common areas, and
newspaper distribution. 36A specific example of a CID imposing
37
political speech restrictions is the community of Rancho Bernardo
north of San Diego, which bans all signs.3 These restrictions are far
31 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 127-28. Some restrictions, such as senior housing, that
mighit seem to run afoul of federal housing discrimination law are actually exempted. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 3607 (2000) (stating that nothing in the subchapter dealing with the Federal Fair
Housing Act that relates to discrimination based on familial status shall be applied to "housing
for older persons"). See generally KoRNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE, supra note 6, at 408-15,
4 17-24 (discussing types and enforceability of covenants, including age restrictions).
32 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 20. Real covenants that "run with the land" were first
recognized in Packenham 's Case, Y.B. Hil. 42 Edw. 3, pl. 14 (1368). McKENZIE, supra note 8,
at 204 n.74. See generally Packenham 's Case, Y.B. Hil. 42 Edw. 3, pl. 14.
33' McKENzIE, supra note 8, at 2 1.
34
35

Id. at 129.
Id. at 15.

36 Id.; see McKenzie, Dynamics, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that HOAs are largely
unrestricted and are not generally considered "governments" for constitutional analysis). A
particularly troubling example of the restrictions regarding political expression that CC&Rs can
impose on residents was that a Vietnam War veteran was prohibited from flying the American
Flag on Flag Day. MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 15 (citing William K. Stevens, Condominium
Associations: New Form of Local Government, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 8, 1988, at 22). Today this
restriction would be prohibited by the Freedom to Display the American Flag Act of 2005. 4
U.S.C.A. § 5 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (prohibiting HOA restrictions on displaying the flag of
the United States of America).
37 Note that this community was recently devastated by a rash of wildfires
in Southern California during October 2007. Fire Deaths, Damage Come into Focus
as Evacuees Cope, CNN, Oct. 29, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007IUS/10/26/
fire.wildftre.calindex.html?iref--newssearch.
38 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 12-13 (citing Lowv, supra note 10, at 93). Rancho
Bernardo is a very large mixed-use CID containing single-family homes, condominiums,
apartments, commercial districts, and light industrial areas. Id. This type of restriction would be
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from illusory, as many CID residents, as well as HOA board
39
members, "survey the community daily looking for infractions."
This way of life, which is already lived by approximately 20 percent
of American citizens, will continue to spread in the coming years as
roughly 50 percent of the new housing that is currently being built in
metropolitan areas will be subject to HOAs.4
II. NORMATIVE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS: "To His HEIRS AND
ASSIGNS, To HAVE ANT) To HOLD FOREVER"

Many commentators have argued that the private ordering of CfI
governance through HOAs, especially regarding political expression,
is undesirable due to the restrictions that CC&Rs often impose on the
expression of residents, as well as non-members .4 1 Further, many
have argued, inter alia, that a possible method available to impose
a public, constitutional regulatory apparatus on HOAs is through
the state action doctrine.4 It is my contention that this type
of thinking-regulating the private by turning it into a de facto
public-is antithetical to the normative values at the root of the
Anglo-American system of private property and limited constitutional
government .4 3 While Anglo-American property rights could be the
subject of an entire article, the following is a brief overview of the
classically liberal political philosophy that our republic and
jurisprudence have at their roots, and which guides much of the legal
analysis to follow.
Property rights have always been at the core of our republic. In
fact, the opportunity to own "new land" was one of the principal
inducements for Englishmen (and others who followed) to settle on
this continent."4 Further, the new colonists' view of property rights

banned by City of Ladue v. Gilleo if the HOA was a municipal government. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
See discussion supra note 12.
39 Low, supra note 2, at 158. See generally KoRNGKOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE, supra note
6, at 431-34 (regarding enforcement in general).
40 Low, supra note 2, at 177. As noted in 200 1, an astounding 80 percent of new home
sales in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area were of property that is a part of a CID.
DERTHICK, supra note 27, at 30.
41 See, e.g., Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 234-35; Kennedy, supra note 14, at 763,
778-79; Womack & Timnmons, supra note 14, at 322-23.
42 See Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 234-35; see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (imposing public constitutional restrictions on a private entity through the "state action"
doctrine).
43 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 15; SANDEFUR, supra note 15, at 1-2, 10; Locke, supra note
15, § 87, at 53-54.
44 ELY, supra note 15, at 10. "[In order to] exploit these favorable circumstances, the
(British) Crown granted charters conveying vast tracts of land to trading companies [such as the
Virginia Company of London] and individual proprietors, such as William Penn. Both Virginia
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was shaped by English constitutional law and tradition: "Americans
associated property rights with the time-honored guarantees of Magna
Carta (121 5).~A Magna Carta, which was originally (forcibly) signed
by King John to protect the English nobility's property and privileges,
"became a celebrated safeguard against arbitrary government. . .. The
colonists venerated Magna Carta as part of their birthrightas English
subjects."4 Several important provisions of Magna Carta drove right
to the protection of private property rights: consent of a body of
representatives (e.g., Parliament, or Congress) was needed to raise
revenue or levy taxes, and ...
[n]o freeman [could] be taken,
imprisoned, [or] disseised [(i.e., deprived of property)] . .. except by
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of land.' With this
provision, Magna Carta secured the rights of owners against arbitrary
deprivation of property without due process of law."4
Further, the view of private property rights in the American
colonies was deeply influenced by the "intellectual currents in the
mother country."48 The seventeenth century was a time of "political
and religious upheaval" in England, from the Civil Wars, through the
Interregnum, the Restoration, and finally to the Glorious
Revolution .49 The Glorious, or Bloodless, Revolution of 1688, in

and Massachusetts, for instance, were founded by business ventures seeking a profit from
colonization. The investors in the Virginia Company of London and the Massachusetts Bay
Company were keenly interested in commercial gain. They anticipated revenue derived from
annual rents imposed on land grants and from trade with the colonies." Id. It is interesting to
note that even though many colonists themselves may have also been driven by religious
concerns, "many colonists hoped to improve their economic position by migration. For instance,
John Winthrop, later the governor of Massachusetts, was impelled to leave England by both
religious zeal and the hope of financial reward. . .. [Tihe 'acquisition and cultivation of land
was the very raison d'etre for the colonies."' Id. (quoting WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 191 (1980)).
45 Id. at 13.
46 Id. (emphasis added). "Down through ages of intrigue, conflict and revolution, of
attempts on the one side to evade it and on the other to re-affirm it, bearing various appropriate
names, none dearer to the English than 'The Great Charter,' it has come to us intact, Still
defining in its brief, general, simple and easily understood language, the rights of [a great]
people ...
"Thornton M. Hinle, Magna Charta: The History of an Evolution, 8 YALE L.
262, 269 (1899) (emphasis added).
47 ELY, supra note 15, at 13 (emphasis added) (omission in original). The Maryland
assembly passed similar language regarding due process in 1639; Massachusetts also has a
similar provision in its Laws and Liberties (1648). Id. Further, William Penn urged the
publication of a commentary on Magna Carta in 1687. Id. "Colonial judges also were influenced
by the Charter. In Giddings v. Brown (1657), a Massachusetts county court recognized as 'a
fundamental law' that property cannot be taken 'to the use or to be made the right or property of
another man, without his owne free consent."' Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
48Id. at 16.
49 Id. at 16-17; see also DAVID L. SMITH, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN BRITISH ISLES,
1603-1 707: THE DOUBLE CROWN (1998).
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which William of Orange and his wife Mary were installed as
monarchs (William III and Mary 11, or if you prefer "William &
Mary"), in many ways was the climax of the age .50 During this period
"English political thinkers analyzed the nature of government. The
most significant of these Whig theorists was John Locke. .. .". 51
John Locke, an English political philosopher of the seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries, laid down many principals that
became part of the core of the Anglo-American common law tradition
of private property and limited government.5 Locke's view of

50 ELY, supra note 15, at 16-17; MICHAEL BARONE, OUR FIRST REVOLUTION: THE
REMARKABLE BRITISH UPHEAVAL THAT INSPIRED AMERICA'S FOUNDING FATHERS 1-3 (2007).

The Glorious Revolution was of paramount importance:
Absolutism, seemingly modern and efficient, seemed the way of the future.
Yet in the long run absolutism did not prevail. Out of one corner of Europe, in
the British Isles, an alternative emerged, constitutional monarchy with limits on
government, guaranteed rights, relatively benign religious toleration, and free market
global capitalism. After the Glorious Revolution the merchant class as well as the
nobility successful [sic] cabined in the power of king and prince. The nobility did not
totally dominate the life of society, and merchants and entrepreneurs were left free to
trade and innovate. And here the key event was the First Revolution [i.e., the
Glorious Revolution], in which the ... stadholder of the Netherlands[, William of
Orange,] supplanted the. ...king of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and ensured that
those countries would continue on a course very different from that of France and its
continental imitators. This First Revolution was thus a long step forward toward the
kind of society we take for granted now. It provided the backdrop for the amazing
growth, prosperity, and military success of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Britain-and for the American Revolution and the even more amazing growth,
prosperity, and military success of the United States.

Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted); see id at 229-37 (describing the political and economic
reverberations after the Glorious Revolution). Also with the Glorious Revolution came the
English Bill of Rights, which further elaborated on the principles contained in Magna Carta and
reigned in the absolutist abuses of James 11.See VERNON BOGDANOR, THE MONARCHY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1995); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA
To THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20 (200 1).
51 ELY, supra note 15, at 17.
52 Id "The common law" is emphasized here and throughout, because the legal traditions
of England and the rest of the English speaking world are fundamentally different from "Code
[or civil] law" countries. The common law (or law that developed over centuries of traditional
use) that existed in France was extinguished along with the king when he was summarily
executed during the French Revolution. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 60. This was the
case because the courts were seen "as [equally] corrupt and worthless as the king." Id The void
was filled by a comprehensive set of bureaucratic statutes promulgated in 1804 by Napoleon
known as the Code Napoleon. Id The Code was based heavily on the Conrus Juris Cavilis (or
"The Body of the Civil Law") codified at the order of the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Emperor
Justinian in AD 528-534. Id at 60-61. As Napoleon's armies marched throughs Europe,
bringing a new brand of civic absolutism, so too they brought the Code. Id at 61. Thus, the
nations of continental Europe, Central and South America, parts of Asia and Afica, and pockets
in common law jurisdictions (Quebec, Louisiana, and Puerto Rico) are "Code law" jurisdictions.
Id This is where many of the colonies of continental imperial powers were located. Id The
United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and other parts of
Africa and Asia are common law jurisdictions-essentially the extent of the British Empire. Id
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government begins with the state of nature-the original "private
sphere" 53 :
To understand political power right ... we must consider
what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of
perfect fr-eedom to order their actions and dispose of their
possessions andperson, as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature; without asking leave, or depending upon
the will of any other man.5
In the state of nature, property rights are God-given-literallythrough the fruits of one's labor, which encloses property from the
"6coninon(s)":
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of
life and convenience.5 5 The earth, and all that is therein, is
given to men for the support and comfort of their being....
... Through the earth, and all inferior creatures, be
common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own
person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour
of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property.. .. [and] excludes the common right of
other men....
...
And the taking of this or that part does not depend on
the express consent of all the commoners...

...
But the chief matter of property being now not the
fruits of the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the
earth itself. .. I think it is plain, that property in that too is
acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants,
improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is
MCKENzIE, supra note 8, at 146.
Locke, supra note 15, § 4, at 18.
That goods should ultimately reach their highest and best use is also a hallmark of
modem neoclassical economic theory. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 16, 27 (1960); see also COOThR & ULEN, supra note 16, at 15-17 (regarding
equilibrium, maximization, and efficiency).
53

54
55
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his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it

56
from the common.

Thus, Locke stated that property existed under natural right before the
7
creation of civic government.f
Locke is one of the first voices that advocated for a limited
government; he believed that government should only be strong
enough to protect its citizens' natural rights and warned of a strong
centralized government 5 8:
doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for
men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make
men partial to themselves and their friends: and, on the other
side, that ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too
far in punishing other; and hence nothing but confusion and
disorder will follow: and that therefore God hath certainly
appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence
of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper
remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature, which
must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their
own case; since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so
unjust as to do brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to
condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this
objection to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men;
and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men 's being judges in their own
cases, and the state of nature is therefore to be endured; I
desire to know what kind of government that is, and how
much better it is than the state of nature, where one man,
commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his
own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases,
without the least liberty to anyone to question or control those
I

56 Locke, supra note 15, §§ 26, 27, 28, 32, at 28-30 (emphasis added) (footnote added);
see also MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 145-46. See generally CURTIS J. BERGER AND JOAN C.
WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE § 1.4, at 65-66 (4th ed. 1997).
57 ELY, supra note 15, at 17.
58 "Limited" here is being used to refer to a form of government that is far more reduced
in its scope of control over the natural liberties of the governed, as opposed to an "absolutist" or
"statist" model of government. The classical, historical example of absolutist governmrent would
be the Ancien R~gimze in France; a modem example would be socialist and communistic
totalitarian governments. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TocQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (Stuart Gilbert, trans., Doubleday 1983) (1856); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-9 (40th anniversary ed. 2002).
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who execute his pleasure and whatsoever he doth, whether
59
led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be submitted to?
Locke viewed government as based on the consent of the governed
and necessitated by the inconveniences of the state of nature.6
Therefore, government existed to protect property rights, which
Locke intertwined with liberty itself: citizens would agree to be
subjects of the government if the government protected their inherent
natural rights .6 1 "[H]e asserted that people organized government to
preserve 'their Lives, Liberties and Estates."'6 2 Locke also harkened
back to Magna Carta by stating that the government could not
arbitrarily seize property and that "the levy of taxes without popular
consent 'invades the FundamentalLaw of Property, and subverts the
end of Government."' 63 Consequently property, like liberty, is
inherently under the purview of the private sphere-for the state to
arbitrarily exact control of an individual's private property would be
overreaching from its limited purpose.64 Thus, property rights became

almost synonymous with liberty

itself.65

Lockean thinking also began

to percolate throughout the English common law. 66 William
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, wrote that
"[s]o great moreover ...is the regard of the law for private property,

that it will not authorize the least violation

of it.,,'6 7

Government, or

more generally law, was therefore established to prevent or punish
those who would violate another's property. 68 In fact, it can be argued
that the common law system "approximate [d] a legal system of
maximum liberty, which allows owners to do anything with their
property that does not interfere with other peoples' property., 6 9 Locke
emphasized that "freedom is not the absence of law; on the contrary,
freedom is the goal to be preserved through law."7
59 Locke, supra note 15, § 13, at 22 (emphasis added).
60 Id.; see MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 146; Locke, supra note 15, § 4, at 18. In drafting
the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson borrowed heavily from this Lockean style
of the social compact. ELY, supra note 15, at 28-29.
61 ELY, supra note 15, at 17.
62 Id (emphasis added).
63 Id (quoting John Locke, The Second Treatise on Government, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 285, 380 (Peter Laslatt ed., 2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967)).
64 Id
65

Id

66Id.
67 Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 135
(University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765)) (emphasis added).
68 SANDEFUR, supra note 15. at 54.
69 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 1 10.
70 Id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 57, at 18 (Peter
Laslett ed., rev. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1963)).
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This type of thinking was also espoused and supported by the great
thinkers Adam Smith and Edmund Burke.' Smith, often regarded as
the father of modem free-market laissez-faire ideas, forms many of
his economic deductions using natural law.7 Further, Burke, who
today is often regarded as a "political conservative," viewed history
as the bulwark of social order and "'.always believed in a higher law
73
..to which nations as well as individuals are eternally subject."'
James Madison summed up this position well in his essay Property:
"'[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort ...
This being the end of government, that alone is a just
government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his
own.917
Ill. ECONoMic EFFICIENCY OF CIDs AND THE FREE-MARKET

The economic efficiencies of, and market forces that affect, CIDs
also point to the continued private ordering of HOAs through
CC&Rs, despite restrictions on political expression. To use public
ordering-public regulation--of HOAs by treating them as state
actors is not only antithetical to classical liberalism and natural law,
but also leads to economic inefficiency and waste.7 If HOAs were
treated like municipalities, much of the economic efficiencies
associated with CIDs would be lost, and market forces that attract
residents to CIDs would be frustrated.
71 See William Clyde Dunn, Adam Smith and Edmund Burke: Complementary
Contemporaries, 7 S. ECON. J. 330, 342 (1941).
72 Id. at 343. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Regnery Publishing 1998) (1776).
73 Dunn, supra note 71, at 331, 337, 339 (quoting JOHN MACUNN, THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF BURKE 24 (1913)). In fact, in many ways Burke and Smith borrow from one
another: the theses of Burke's Thoughts and Details on Scarcity and Smith's The Wealth of
Nations are very similar. Id at 344. Burke's view on property and economic theory meshes with
his view that the social order of things, like the common law, evolves over time. COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 16, at 118. This view was also espoused by the later-day philosopher Friedrich
August von Hayek in his defense of classical liberalism and the free market from attacks by
collectivist and socialist thought in the twentieth century. See id. at 118. See generally F. A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (Bruce Caldwell ed., University of Chicago Press 2007)
(1944) (defending classical liberalism and warning that the dangers of collectivism and
socialism lead to totalitarianism). This work heavily influenced President Ronald Reagan and
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; also, this work was published in comic book form by Look
Magazine in 1950, which was distributed by General Motors to its employees. See Ronald Chen
& Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9-17, 26 n.89, 31-32 (2004) (citing Ludvig von Mises Institute, The
http://www.mnises.org/books/TRTS/
(last
visited
Illustrated
Road
to
Serfdom,
Mar. 8, 2009)).
74 SANDEFUR, supra note 15, at 54 (quoting James Madison, Property, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 515 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999)) (emphasis added, retained, and removed).
75 Id. at 8-9.
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A. Economic Efficiency of CIDs
Economic efficiency can essentially be defined as the concept that
an outcome, when reached, is efficient if. i) "it is not possible to
produce more output using the same combination of inputs"; and ii)
"it is not possible to produce the same amount of output using a
lower-cost combination of inputs."7 Servitudes and other restrictions
on the use of land can be, in and of themselves, economically
efficient. To prevent other fee owners from building or doing
something undesirable on neighboring land,
one need not buy th[eir] fee [at high cost] but can purchase a
restriction [at lower cost]. Moreover, the owner can liquidate
a portion of her interest by selling a servitude, while retaining
productive use of the property .... The law should encourage
people to enter such efficiency-maximizing transactions by

enforcing them without undue transaction

costs. 7 8

One could question whether an efficiency-based economic analysis
of private restrictions put on land might contradict the principle that
land should be freely alienable in order for it to be used efficiently.
However, the first response to this is that the restriction, in the
abstract, is freely alienable, despite encumbering the fee title of the
underlying real estate. Further, when an entire community is
encumbered by a system of reciprocal burdens, additional efficiency

is the

result. 79

"Although a specific parcel loses value when it is

burdened by covenants, the loss may be offset by the benefits of
identical restrictions binding neighboring lots, which create a valuable
residential community." 80 For example, all residents (and the market)
assign a higher value to their interests when no one is permitted to
burn rubbish in their back yard or paint the exterior of their unit
fuchsia. Thus, CIDs effectuate a mutually-beneficial situation through
efficiency.
An important part of the efficiency analysis of CIDs has to do with

transaction

costs.8

Transaction costs can essentially be understood as

the costs associated with any transaction-including the costs related

76
77

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 16.
See Komngold, supra note 2, at 517.

78 Id
79

Id.

8Id (citing Adult Group Props., Ltd. v. Inler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 198~7)
(discussing how servitudes enhance value of land); Rofe v. Robinson, 329 N.W.2d 704, 707
(Mich. 1982) (discussing valuable "property rights")).
81 Id
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to searching, bargaining, and enforcement. 82 This concept directly
applies to choosing private means of ordering versus public:
"Administrative efficiencies also result when decision making is
delegated to private government. This arrangement prevents
duplicative enforcement actions by individual owners, reduces
transaction costs in the negotiation process, relieves the burden of
obtaining consent from all owners, and may allow the community to
take advantage of its members' expertise., 8
Enforcement and management costs are also inherent in
transaction costs. 84 Much of the politics inherent in the governing of a
municipality (or any public government, for that matter) are removed
with the private administration of HOAs. This is especially so when
the HOA is managed by an HOA management company. It is now a
common practice for HOA boards to hire experts and management
firms to run the HOA as efficiently and cost-effectively as
possible; this "emphasize[s business] management over member
involvement." 85 Thus, running an HOA comes down to 'just good or
bad business management practices."8 Moreover, in general, private
87
ordering itself produces efficiency as opposed to public ordering.
8
8
Private ordering occurs in markets and involves agreement between
parties .89 Contrast this to public ordering, where transactions occur in
the context of bureaucratic regulation, inflexible procedures, and
results in which many do not give their consent-truly an inefficient
solution. 90
The services that CIDs provide can also be viewed as being more
efficient than their municipal counterparts due to the free-rider

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 92.
Komngold, supra note 2, at 52 1. Also, clarity of CC&Rs versus constitutional doctrine
reduces transactional costs and promotes efficiency. See COOTER & ULEN, sulpra note 16, at 94.
See generally Coase, supra note 55, for more on transaction costs, property rights, and
efficiency.
84COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 92.
85 McKENziE, supra note 8, at 143.
86 Id at 139.
87 COOTER &ULEN, supra note 16, at 141-42.
88 Id at 141.
82
83

89 Id

90Id An interesting empirical example of the efficiency gains associated with private
versus public ordering is the scenario involving oyster fishing on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.
Id (citing Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelley, Property Rights and Efficiency in the
Oyster Industry, 18 J.L. & ECON. 521 (1975)). Some states have held oyster beds to be common
property, while others have granted private fishing leases. Id Using an efficiency analysis based
on labor productivity, Professors Agnello and Donnelley found that if all oyster beds had been
privately leased, income would have risen by 50 percent. Id at 141-42. An associated concept is
the "tragedy of the commons." See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 2 (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975).
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problem that municipalities face. 91 The free-rider problem, at its
essence, is the notion that there will be consumers of a "public good"
who do not pay for their consumption.9 In economic terms, a "public
good" is a good where there is no "rivalry" or mutually-exclusive
aspect to consumption. 9 3 A pertinent example would be law
enforcement or security. In municipalities, the police force is a public
good subject to free-riders-policemen maintain order for all people,
even if some have not paid their taxes or are not residents of
the area. 94 Those who have not paid their taxes or who do not pay
taxes are free-riders, as are nonresidents passing through. The
counterexample is security forces in CIDs. They only protect
residents, guests, and invitees of the CID. To live in the CLD, a
resident must pay the assessed HOA fees. 95 In this way CIDs
eliminate much of the free-rider problem that municipalities face; this
promotes efficiency.9
CIDs also promote economic efficiency for non-residents. The
municipal governments in rapidly growing areas may not be able to
provide adequate services to their ever-increasing numbers of
residents. 97 The inadequacy of city services is compounded by the
fact that many municipalities significantly expanded in area during
the later half of the twentieth century. 98 The Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations has called HOAs "'.the most significant
privatization of local government responsibilities in recent times."9
The creation and enforcement of CC&Rs have replaced the function
of zoning laws in many areas. 100 Furthermore, CIDs can provide
91 Low, supra note 2, at 187.
92 COOTER & ULEN, supra note

16, at 107.

Id A private good, on the other hand, is a good where there is rivalry/mutual
exclusivity in consumption: if I hold fee simple absolute in Blackacre, you do not. See id. at
108.
94 See id at 108.
93

95 Id
96 Many HOAs and advocates of HOAs make the compelling argument that if residents
are paying fees for services (such as rubbish removal) and for maintenance of common areas
(e.g., repaving streets), then they are being doubly taxed if the CID they live in is within the
boundaries of a municipality. MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 165. This is the case because the
residents are also paying for city services that they do not use, or use less of, either through
property tax or some other form of local tax. Id Using this logic, residents who are members of
HOAs whose fees provide for substantial services should be allowed to deduct their BOA fees
from their property taxes. Id
97 Low, supra note 2, at 189-90.
98 See id at 190. An example of this trend is seen in the city of San Antonio, Texas, where
69 square miles were contained within the city limits in 1950; the city expanded to 253 square
miles by 1973. Id
99 MCKENZIE,
supra note 8, at 22 (quoting U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS INTHE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 18 (1989)).
100Low, supra note 2, at 177. It is interesting to note that some land use planners and
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services for residents, allowing the strained municipality to focus on
its residents that do not live in a CID. In a way, municipalities transfer
responsibilities that they may not be able to meet to real estate
developers. Some recently fast-growing areas, such as Las Vegas,
actually make it very difficult for new housing to be organized in any
form other than CIDs (that are subject to HOAs).10' In this way, many
of the municipal "growing pains" can be avoided using private
planning and ordering. Thus, instead of a municipality expanding
through traditional means, it may transfer the costs of planning,
development, and maintenance of new expansion to developers
(whether the expansion is new structures on a block or a vast tract).
The increased effeciency benefits not only the residents of the CIDs,
but also residents of the surrounding municipality or political
division, as well as neighboring populations.
B. CIDs and Market Forces

The private ordering of CIDs not only adds dramatically to their
economic efficiency, but also allows for the effects of positive
market forces that would be frustrated if HOAs were treated like
municipalities. One of the most basic consequences of allowing
market forces to act more freely on CIDs is that "property value" can
be maximized. The maximization of property values has been a
positive force for millions of Americans. Evan McKenzie has likened
CIDs to a type of "hostile privatism," where the preservation of
property values is the highest social goal of the organization. 12To
me, this is entirely justified-even welcomed-as a large number of
Americans (64 percent) put the majority of their wealth and savings
into the purchase of a home.' 0 3 In this desire to maintain values,
physical appearance matters a great deal: residents "endeavor to keep

developers believe that existing non-CID communities in municipalities should be given the
option to switch from a zoning regime to a CC&R regime governed by HOAs, as they are more
efficient. Id
101Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 237-38. Las Vegas is one such city: ...[tihe City of Las
Vegas [has] virtually mandate[d] that new development be done with homeowner associations
[through their zoning laws]'...Id (citing Evan McKenzie, Private Gated Communities in
the American Urban Fabric: Emerging Trends in their Production, Practices, and Regulation,
Keynote address at the University of Glasgow, Scotland, Conference: Gated Communities:
Building Social Division or Safer Communities? 5 (Sept. 18-19, 2003), available at
(first three modifications in
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sps/cnrpapersword/gated/mckenzie.pdt)
original).
102MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 18-19.
103LOW, supra note 2, at 159. The 64 percent figure is accurate as of 2004. See id The
point is that a huge percentage of Americans have the majority of their savings invested in their
home.
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their neighbors 'up to snuff.""10 4 Value-maximizing, rational
homeowners will desire to live in communities subject to HOAs and
restricted by CC&Rs in order to minimize neighborhood deterioration
05
and unpleasantness.'
Thus, CC&Rs provide financial security through protecting and
increasing property value.' 06 An overriding purpose of the HOA is to
protect property values through the maintenance and "preservation of
the project's character and appearance. In carrying out this purpose
the board of directors has all the powers of any non-profit corporation
...Beyond these basic requirements there is an enormous range
of restrictions that the developer may have created as part of a
target-marketing strategy."' 0 7 Furthermore, the system of CC&Rs
allows developers to create facilities, such as pools or tennis courts,
that residents may not be able to afford if they lived outside of a
CID.'10 8 Very simply, this also positively affects market value, as a
house where the residents have access to a pool and tennis courts is
worth more than the same house that does not. Moreover, "[r]eserving
open space as a common amenity not only brings aesthetic benefits
but also can lessen the developer's cost under planned unit
development (PUD) zoning. ... These savings and efficiencies can be
passed on to residential consumers." 0 9
The "aesthetic benefits" that CC&Rs create in CIDs, when
combined with the protection of value that comes from efficiency
maximization and increased market value, creates a socio-economic
framework that Setha Low argues allows "middle-class families [to]
imprint their residential landscapes with 'niceness,' reflecting their
0
own landscape aesthetic of orderliness, consistency, and control.""1
Thus, the middle classes accept the excessive restrictions imposed
through CC&Rs out of their anxiety to maintain hard-fought class
distinctions and socio-economic positions.1 1 ' The diminishing job
market in the 1980s and 1990s created a trend of downward mobility
in some classes due to the nation's partial move from an industrial
economy to a more service-industry-oriented economy.'" 2 The
*.

104Id
105M.dat

154.

106M. at 159.

107McKENziE, supra note 8, at 128-29.
101See Korngold, supra note 2, at 513.
1091d (citing U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONS,
RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS
IN
THE
InTFRGOVERN'MENTAL SYSTEM? 4 (1989)).
0
11Low, supranote 2, at 167 (emphasis added).
IISee id at 172-73.
lIId.
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CC&Rs in CIDs assured residents of their class distinctions when
their previously class- and status-conveying suburbs (municipalities)
13
began to decay.'

Thus, property values and "niceness" are the goals of many
CIDs. This is what makes CIDs desirable to many Americans, even if
they cannot post political signs in their windows or have political
rallies-perhaps this actually adds to the desirability for some. In fact,
many residents of CIDs are rationally apathetic to HOA decisions4 and
1
CC&Rs as long as their home values are protected and increase. ,
Currently, concerns relating to maintaining the value of property
may be heightened due to what began as the "credit crunch," or
"'mortgage meltdown," and its effect on real estate. What had
developed into a true financial crisis and world economic downturn
by early 2009 started when financial institutions and private investors
had crippling losses from different types of asset-backed securities
that contained (in various ways) what ended up being "bad debt"especially sub-prime mortgages that went into default.1 1 ' Specifically,
113
Id
114McKENZIE, supra note 8, at 142-43. In this way, many residents of CIDs could be
considered rationally apathetic to HOA control, as shareholders of public companies tend to be
rationally apathetic to corporate decisions as long as the stock price increases. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 396-97
(1983) (discussing shareholder voting, the collective action problem, and the free-rider
problem). "Shareholders express views by buying and selling shares." Id. at 396. If shareholders
are unhappy with corporate decisions and governance, they simply sell their stock. See id.
115T follow the current financial meltdown as chronicled in the news, see, for example,
Greg Hitt & Jonathan W~eisman, Congress Strikes $789 Billion Stimulus Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb.
12, 2009, at Al1; Deborah Solomon, John Hilsenrath & Damian Paletta, U.S. Plots New Phase in
Banking Bailout, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17-18, 2009, at AlI; Deborah Solomon, Damian Paletta &
John Hilsenrath, U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation's Largest Banks - Recipients Include Citi, Bank
ofAmerica, Goldman; Government PressuresAll to Accept Money as Partof Broadened Rescue
Effort, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008, at Al; Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout
Passes as Economy Slips Further, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4-5, 2008, at Al; Susanne Craig, Deborah
Solomon, Carrick Mollenkamnp & Matthew Karnitschnig, Lehman Races Clock; Crisis Spreads,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13-14, 2008, at Al; James R. Hagerty, Ruth Simon & Damian Paletta, U.S.
Seizes Mortgage Giants: Government Ousts CEOs of Fannie, Freddie; Promises Up to $200
Billion in Capital, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at Al1; Robin Sidel, Dennis K. Berman & Kate
Kelly, J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, as Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis:Ailing Firm
Sold for Just $2 a Share in US.-Backed Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at Al; Carrick
Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Banks Fear a Deepening of Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
2008, at Al; Damian Paletta, U.S. to Revamp Credit Rules, Drawing From Crisis Lessons:
Paulson Plan Seeks to Tame Excesses in Mortgage Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2008, at AlI;
Sudeep Reddy, Jobs Data Suggest U.S. Is in Recession: Largest Payroll Fall in Five Years
Spurs New Stimulus Talk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8-9, 2008, at Al; E. S. Browning, Fed Moves to
Curb Risk of Recession: Investors Flock to Gold as Metal Hits New High; Fans in the
Mainstream, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2008, at Al; David Enrich, Robin Sidel & Susanne Craig,
World Rides to Wall Street's Rescue: Citigroup, Merrill Tap Foreign-Aid Lifelines; Damage
Tops $90 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2008, at AlI; Damian Paletta, Valerie Bauerlein & James
R. Hagerty, Countrywide Seeks Rescue Deal: Bank of America Eyes Stricken Home Lender as
Crisis Grinds on, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2008, at Al; Greg Ip & Joellen Perry, Fed Chief Opens
the Door to 'Substantive' Rate Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2008, at AlI; David Enrich, Randall
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many home mortgages were securitized in the form of collateralized
debt obligations or other types of mortgage-backed securities.' 16 For
the most part, the crisis was triggered by the decrease in property
values in the areas of the country where they had been the highest."I17
Despite the fact that the current financial crisis began with sub-prime
mortgages, it began to affect what had been the classically credit
worthy as well, as a general lack of confidence developed in credit
markets by 2008. 118 The credit crunch and its associated recession is
certainly the most significant financial crisis in over a decade and has
seriously effected foreign economies as well."19 In this climate the
protection of property values is all the more paramount, especially as

Smith & Damian Paletta, Citigroup, Merrill Seek More Foreign Capital Moves,
ForeshadowingFurther Write-Downs, Raise Regulatory Issues, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2008, at
Al; Carrick Mollenkamp, Edward Taylor & Anita Raghavan, UBS's Subprime Hit Deepens
Credit Worries: Bank Gets $11.5 Billion From Singapore, Others; 'Unknowable' Bottom?,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2007, at Al; James R. Hagerty, Mortgage Crisis Extends Its Reach:
Fannie,Freddie Regain Dominance as Investors Shrink From Housing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13,
2007, at AlI; Robin Sidel, Monica Langley & David Enrich, Two Weeks That Shook the Titans
of Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2007, at Al; Robin Sidel, Monica Langley & Gregory
Zuckerman, Citigroup CEO Plans to Resign as Losses Grow: Bank's Board to Meet With
Prince on Sunday; SEC Queries Accounting, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3-4, 2007, at AlI; Serena Ng &
Carrick Mollenkamnp. Fresh Credit Worries Grip Markets: Banks' Woes Spur Fear of
Reluctance to L~end; Stocks React Sharply, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2007, at AlI; Another Notch
Down: The Fed Cuts Interest Rates Again, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3-9, 2007, at 86; Randall Smith,
O 'Neal Out as Merrill Reels From Loss: Startled Board Ditches a Famously Aloof CEO; The
Revenge of 'Mother,' WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at AlI; Spooking Investors: FinancialMarkets
Remain on Edge Because the Credit Crunch Has Not Been Solved, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27-Nov.
2, 2007, at 79-80; Amid the Gloom: The Credit Crunch Has Cast a Cloud Over the World
Economy. Thank Goodness It Started Out So Strong, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20-26, 2007, at 34-37.
6
11 Carrick Mollenkamp & Ian McDonald, Behind Subprime Woes, A Cascade of Bad Bets:
One Loan's Journey Shows Culture of Risk; The Fall of a Fund Whiz, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,
2007, at Al; Serena Ng & Carrick Mollenkamnp, Merrill Takes $8.4 Billion Credit Hit: It
Plunged into CDOs in '03, Hiring Pioneer of the Debt Securities, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2007, at
Al. 117
See Kelly Evans, Serena Ng & Ruth Simon, Decline in Home Prices Accelerates: Fed's
Efforts Have Only Muted Effect on Mortgage Rates, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2008, at Al1; Sudeep
Reddy & Sara Murray, Housing, Bank Troubles Deepen: ForeclosuresReach a New Record;
Home Equity Falls, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,2008, at Al1.
"$ See Jeffrey McCracken, Lending Squeeze Hits Ailing Firms: Rescue Financing Is
Getting Scarcer; Retailers on Brink, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2008, at AlI; Serena Ng & Carrck
Mollenkamp, Fresh Credit Worries Grip Markets: Banks' Woes Spur Fear of Reluctance to
Lend; Stocks React Sharply, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2007, at Al; see also Rick Brooks & Ruth
Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy: As Housing Boomed, Industry
PushedLoans to a BroaderMarket, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at Al.
119Greg Ip, Mark Whitehouse & Aaron Lucchetti, US. Mortgage Crisis Rivals S&L
Meltdown: Toll of Economic Shocks May Lingerfor Years; A Global Credit Crunch, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 10, 2007, at Al; see Timothy Aeppel, Credit Scare Spreads in US.. Abroad: Loan
Terms Tighten for Smaller Businesses; Recipe for Slower Growth, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2008, at
Al; Patrick Barta & Marcus Walker, Developing Economies Face Reckoning as US. Stumbles:
After Prolonged Boom, Emerging Markets Feel Downside of Global Ties, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
2008, at Al; Alistair MacDonald & Mark Whitehouse, London Fog: Credit Crunch Pounds
UK. Economy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2008, at Al.
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by mid-2009 homeowners continue to face fears of a broader
20
recession and even stagflation 1
Lastly, the continued private ordering of HOAS with respect to
restrictions on political expression (or otherwise) protects the
important ability to make personal choices and consent to transactions
in a market economy. CC&Rs represent utility-maximizing choices
that HOA participants make.'12 ' Consumers of goods make choices
based on their own personal preferences and predilections in order to
maximize their own personal utility (i.e., happiness, fulfillment,

satisfaction).12 2 This is the basis of utility maximization theory.123 "In
residential servitude regimes, an owner receives increased 'health,
happiness, and peace of mind' in exchange for accepting community
restrictions and power. The servitudes provide 'character,'
'integrity[,] and tranquility' for the neighborhood."'124 Moreover, the
concept of personal choice drives at consent. Residents consent to live
by the CC&Rs, with all their restrictions on political expression,
when they move into a CID and accept their deed on closing.12
Furthermore, the conventional wisdom-apart from the few state
courts that have granted expansive expression rights on private
property-is that individuals waive many of their public free speech
rights on private property that is controlled by private entities, like the
common areas of HOAs. 12 6 Residents "agree[] to be bound by
[CC&Rs] every bit as much as contracting parties agree to be
bound." 2 7 This concept can be summed-up easily enough in the
practical statement that:
If you do not like [living in a CID subject to CC&Rs and the
authority of a HOA] you can buy a house across the street
where the rules and rule-making procedures may be different
120Greg ip, Fears of Stagflation Return as Price Increases Gain Pace: Fed Cuts Outlook
for Economic Growth Amid Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2008, at Al1; George Melloan,
Why 'Stimulus' Will Mean Inflation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A13.
121See Korngold, supra note 2, at 519.
122COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 22. "Utility" could generally be described as a
measure of consumer satisfaction arrived at through preference ordering. Id at 22-23.
123
I.See generally id at 23-25, for background on utility maximization theory.
124 Komgold, supra note 2, at 519 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hidden Harbour Estates,
Inc. v. Norman, 309 So.2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017,
1024 (Okla. 1985); Gregory v. State, 495 A.2d 997 (R.I. 1985)).
125SeRandy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
78 VA. L. REv. 821 (1992). But see McKENZIE, supra note 8, at 147 (contradicting the
commonly accepted notion that moving in (and then not moving out) signifies consent).
126Low, supra note 2, at 162.
127RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING TnE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 41 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY]; see Korngold, supra
note 2, at 5 16 (describing the benefits of servitudes as "contract benefits").
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and more to your liking. The cost of exit is quite low....
This applies when you make your initial decision of where to
live as well as when you continue to remain within the
28
jurisdiction [of the HOA]. 1
IV. STATE ACTION: THE PRIVATE BECOMES "PUBLIC"
The economic efficiency of CIDs,.and market forces inherent in
a system of private ordering of CIDs, need continued protection.
The classically liberal notions of government upon which this
republic was founded must continue to influence our decision-making
regarding good and just governing, especially where property rights29
one of the cornerstones of liberty itself-are concerned.1
Many CC&Rs do restrict political expression. An example is the
community of Bear Creek, Washington,13 0 a CID with 500 residents,
and private sewers and streets.' The HOA prohibits satellite dishes,
unkcempt landscaping, and on-street parking. 32 Of special interest to
this Note, the CC&Rs also prohibit firearms and flagpoles. 3 3' The
president of the HOA actually "boasts that they have moved ahead of
government by being able to enforce these restrictions through
covenants that in the public sector might run afoul of constitutional
restrictions and statutory limitations." 3 Many commentators have
1 28

BJ'flr, PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 127, at 41-42. By "cost of exit"
Randy E. Barnett is referring to the financial cost of moving as well as other sacrifices, such as
perhaps not having access to the CID pool anymore. Id. at 42 (citing Barnett, supra note 125, at
902-05 (defending the claim that there can be actual consent to "immutable" rules if the cost of
exit is 29low enough)).
1 See ELY, supra note 15; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 26-27, 34; Locke, supra
note 15, §§ 26, 27, 32, at 28-30; SANDEFUR, supra note 15, at 1-2, 10. Furthermore,
[i]t can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretence of a repugnancy,
may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature.
.. . [This] might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The
courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise
WILL instead of juDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of
their pleasure to that of the legislative body.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 380-81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge
University Press 2003) (emphasis added; capitalization in original). See generally GEOFFREY R.
STONE, Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SuNsThIN, MARK V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S.
KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39-42 (5th ed. 2005).
130Low, supra note 2, at 162-63.
131 Id.
132Id.
134Id. at 163 (citing Mary Massaron Ross, Larry J. Smith & Robert D. Pritt, The Zoning
Process: Private Land-Use Controls and Gated Communities, the Impact of Private Property
Rights Legislation, and Other Recent Developments in the Law, 28 URB. LAW. 801 (1996)). It is
interesting to note that in Ladue (the case prohibiting blanket restrictions on signs in municipal
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observed that HOAs exercise this type of restrictive power over their
residents as "pseudo-governments," without the same constitutional
restraints that apply to governments. 135 One must hold the above
factors in mind to analyze the proposition that HOAs should be
treated as municipalities, or state actors, with respect to, and because
of, their restrictions on political expression-in essence transforming
them into a public entity for the purposes of regulation.
A. The HOA as a Government: Marsh v. Alabama-First Amendment
Expression and Fifth Amendment Takings
Courts generally view HOAs as business entities rather than
private governments.136 Through the state action doctrine, however,
HOAs could be viewed as the functional equivalent of a municipal
government that is bound by the United States Constitution. This is
because they act and function like municipalities and control areas
resembling towns or cities.137 The leading case dealing with this
matter is Marsh v. Alabama,138 which dealt with the religious
expression of a Jehovah's Witness who was convicted of a criminal
trespass after handing out literature in the "company town" of
Chickasaw, Alabama.' 39 Justice Black reasoned that because the
company town had characteristics similar to a municipality and
functioned like a municipality, it should be held to the same
constitutional standard as a municipality.140 Further, he disagreed that
property rights should be paramount:

ordinances) the court expressly states,
A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our
culture and our law ... ; that principle has a special resonance when the government
seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there....
their own
.. [lIndividual residents themselves have strong incentives to keep
property values up and to prevent 'visual clutter' in their own yards and
neighborhoods-incentives markedly different from those of persons who erect signs
on others' land, in others' neighborhoods, or on public property. Residents'
self-interest diminishes the danger of the 'unlimited' proliferation of residential signs
that concerns the City of Ladue.
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 59697, nn.44-45 (1980); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam)). While this
may be so, an equally compelling statement might be that this very same liberty at home would
allow people to choose what type of legal residential arrangement in which to live, and even
more generally what type of neighborhood or community to live in.
135See. e.g., Low, supra note 2, at 167; Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 234.
136
MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 2 1.
37
1 See Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 234.
138326 U.S. 501 (1946); see MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 155-56.
'39 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503-04.
1401d. at 507-08.
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We do not agree that the corporation's property interests
settle the question. The State urges in effect that the
corporation's right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is
coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the
conduct of his guests. We can not accept that contention.
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it. Thus, the owners of privately held bridges,
ferries, turnpikes, and railroads may not operate them as
freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are
built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since
their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to
4
state regulation.'1 '
In an extension of this contention, the Court stated that since the
company that owned the town acted like, or in the stead of, a
municipal government, it should be treated as one:
The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the
liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with
the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state
statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action
by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute
religious literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth
42
Amendments to the Constitution.1
In the final paragraph of the majority opinion, the Court endorsed
liberty for those residing in company towns; however, by doing this
the Court restricted the private property rights-and consequently
liberty-of the corporation (i.e., shareholders of the corporation) that
owned the town:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press
and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact
that the latter occupy a preferredposition. As we have stated
before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the
First Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government
141Id at 505-06 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omnitted). I would argue that no
private facility is "built and operated primarily to benefit the public" whether it is a ferry,
railroad,
company town, or CID.
42

1

Id. at 508.
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by free men" and we must in all cases "weigh the
circumstances and ...appraise the .. . reasons .. . in support
of the regulation . . . of [those] rights." In our view the
circumstance that the property rights to the premises where
the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were
held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify' the
State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the
enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state
statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal
punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute
religious literature in a company town, its action cannot
stand. 143
Thus, Marsh articulated one of the major theories attributing state
action to private parties-a theory that prefers speech or expression
over property rights. In this decision, the expressive rights of the
public on private property were trumpeted. Consequently, however,
private property rights, which are at least equally as important to a
free society that prides itself on promoting liberty, became diluted.'"4
Much of the evolution of the common law after Marsh focuses on
political expression and free speech in privately-owned shopping
centers, a somewhat analogous idea to a CID, as private shopping
centers are the new "private equivalent of the agora," whereas CIDs
could be seen as the private equivalent of the municipality (not to
mention that many large mixed-use CIDs contain shopping
centers).145 However, a recent Supreme Court of New Jersey case
discussed infra, Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers
Homeowners' Association,14 6 brings the issue full circle and back to
47
restrictions on political expression in CIDs. 1
Nonetheless, it is useful from a doctrinal standpoint to examine the
case law as it relates to private shopping centers, as the legal issues,
from a property rights perspective, are very similar, if not analogous.
The first lead "shopping center case" was Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 4 which
143Id. at

509 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (ellipses in original).
144 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 26-27, 34. Contra Curtis J. Berger, PruneYard
Revisited: PoliticalActivity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 633 (1991).
14' MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 157.
1- 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
147Despite speech rights being somewhat broader in the New Jersey Constitution than in
the United States Constitution, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that these rights are not
absolute and can be waived or otherwise curtailed through private arrangement. Id. at 1063.
M'391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976).
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followed the approach taken in Marsh. Justice Marshall held that
shopping centers were the functional equivalent of the business
district of a town for the purposes of the First Amendment and that
private ownership did not permit the owners to disallow peaceful
picketing. 149 Interestingly, Justice Black, who spoke for the Court in
Marsh, dissented in Logan Valley using a private property-conscious
Fifth Amendment takings argument:
[Wihether this Court likes it or not, the Constitution
recognizes and supports the concept of private ownership of
property. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[njo person
shall ...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall privateproperty be takenfor public
use, without just compensation." This means to me that there
is no right to picket on the private premises of another to try
to convert the owner or others to the views of the pickets. It
also means, I think, that if this Court is going to arrogate to
itself the power to act as the Government's agent to take a
part of [the owner's] property to give to the pickets for their
use, the Court should also award [him] just compensation for
the property taken. 5 0
He went on to criticize the Court for relying on his opinion in
5
Marsh as primary support for its reasoning allowing the picketing.' '
The majority somehow converted the private property into public
property; however, Justice Black claimed that Marsh was never
meant to apply to a scenario like the one at bar.152 He stated, in
essence, that the holding in Marsh is extremely limited because the
town of Chickasaw was identical to any other American town in
every way, except that it was entirely owned by the Gulf Shipping
Corporation. 15 3 Justice Black noted the differences: "I can find very
little resemblance between the shopping center involved in this case
and Chickasaw, Alabama. There are no homes, there is no sewage
disposal plant, there is not even a post office on this private property
54
which the Court now considers the equivalent of a 'town."",
Irony aside, Justice Black insisted that the Marsh view of state
action should not apply to a privately-owned shopping center. In
4

1 9 Id. at

325.

d at 330-31 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
151Id. at 33 1.
15

152Id.

153Id.
154Id
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1976, Logan Valley was overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB.'155 In a
similar sho pping center picketing dispute, the Court used the
reasoning and language of Justice Black's Logan Valley dissent to
state that the private property must assume nearly all the aspects and
functions of a municipal government to be held to the same
constitutional standard.156 This much narrower reading of Marsh is
still the test today for the type of state action required for an entity to
"'.[step into] the shoes of the State"'. for the purposes of the United

States Constitution.157

An antecedent case to Hudgens is Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,158 in
which the Court said the entity must "perform[] the full spectrum of
municipal powers [to stand] in the shoes of the State." 5 9 The Court
further stated:
We do say that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
private property owners, as well as the First Amendment
rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected. The
Framers of the Constitution certainly did not think these
fundamental rights of a free society are incompatible with
each other. There may be situations where accommodations
between them, and the drawing of lines to assure due
60
protection of both, are not easy.1
This statement by the Court seems to speak to the truth of the
matter. The sanctity of private property rights, as well as that of
freedom of expression (especially political speech) may be in tension,
but are not fundamentally incompatible, especially with regard to
expression in legitimate public forums. Interestingly, the opinion does
not define the specific nature of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
rights of shopping center owners.' 61
Nonetheless, the takings argument used by Justice Black in Logan
Valley is compelling. The taking of private property without just
compensation by the government is prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment.162 The Founding Fathers proclaimed: "nor shall private
155424 U.S. 507 (1976).
56

1

57

1

Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 250; see MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 157.
Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 250 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569

(1972)) (emphasis removed).
158407 U.S. 551 (1972).
1591d.
60

at 569.

1 Id. at 5 70.
161See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 343 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980).
162U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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property be taken for public use without just compensation."' 6 ' That
private property should at all times be protected from encroachment
by the government is one of the founding principles of our republic. 164
Thus, federal precedent has rested since 1976 with Hudgens' narrow
and exacting test for state action of private entities on private
property. While one can certainly make the argument that even a
narrow standard for state action crosses the line when the protection
of property rights is concerned, a narrow standard is certainly
desirable over one that is expansive.
B. State Constitutions:More Expansive Protection of Free
Expression-The Possibility of IncreasedRegulation Through
Broader Standards?
The constitutions of many states contain more broadly defined and
applied expressive rights.16 5 This has allowed for the possibility of
courts to apply much more expansive protections to expressive
rights-even on private property-using state constitutions. While it
is the minority position among states, several states, including
California and New Jersey, have granted broad protection in various
66
forms.'1
The case that opened the door to this type of expansive state
protection, and rejected a federal takings argument, is PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins.'67 In PruneYard, several high school
students were in the central courtyard of PruneYard shopping center
attempting to solicit signatures against a United Nations resolution
that condemned Zionism. 16 8 The California Supreme Court held that
the students' political expression on the privately-owned grounds of
PruneYard shopping center was protected, and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed. 169 The owner of the shopping center had
163Id. Recently this clause, as applied to eminent domain, has generated a great deal of
controversy in the wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The Court
deferred to the city in terms of the efficacy of their plan for the private revitalization of the Fort
Trumbull area of New London, Connecticut, and found that the plan did not violate the Fifth
Amendment because it served the public purpose of economic revitalization. Id at 486-87; see
Ryan J. Sevcik, Trouble in Fort Trumbull: Using Eminent Domainfor Economic Development
in Kelo v. City of New London, 85 NEB. L. REV. 547 (2006).
164
See ELY, supra note 15, at 4; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 26-27, 34; Locke,
supra note i5, §§ 26-27, 32, 87, at 28-30, 53-54; SANDEFUR, supra note 15, at 1-2, 10.
165See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. L.
166This also includes Massachusetts, Colorado, and Washington. Fashion Valley Mall,
LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 758 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 94 (2008); see Berger,
supra note 144, at 634 n. 10.
167 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see MCKENzIE, supra note 8, at 157.
65
' PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 77.
169Id. at 88.
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claimed that when the state protected the students' political
expression that he wished to prevent on his property, the state was
actually taking away his property rights without compensation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and infringing on his free speech rights in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
70
States Constitution.1

The Court found more expansive expression rights on private
property under the California Constitution, which has more expansive
free speech protections than the United States Constitution.17 '1 The
California Supreme Court had held "that sections 2 and 3 of article I
of the California Constitution protect speech and petitioning,
reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are
privately owned."172 When the case reached the United States
Supreme Court, the Court stated that "neither [the owner's] federally
recognized property rights nor their First Amendment rights have
been infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision
recognizing a right of [the students] to exercise state-protected rights
of expression and petition on [the owner's] property."'573 The
precedent set in PruneYard was that there is no federally-protected
First Amendment right to engage in political expression on private
property, but there may be such expression rights protected by the
state-and property owners cannot rely on a federal Fifth Amendment
74
takings argument to prevent such expression.1
The notion of applying state constitutions to political expression
on private property has occurred with many types of private property
since PruneYard, such as office parks, universities, and residential
CIDs (of specific interest to this Note).175 The late Professor Curtis
Berger advocated an extension of public political expression on
private property through a number of strategies, including state
constitutions (as in PruneYard), as well as the common law notions of
the public forum and marketplace.'17 He claimed there is a necessity
for this extension for the proper functioning of "participatory
democracy":

170MIdat
17
72
1

84-86.
d at 79-80; see CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3; MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 157.
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74

(1980).
173Prune Yard,
74

447 U.S. at 88.
supra note 8, at 157.
144, at 634.

' See id.; MCKENZIE,
175Berger, supra note
176Id. at 659-78.
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This [argument] is informed by steadfast faith in political
talk. As that talk becomes ever more costly, the need to
preserve the domain for cheap talk and grassroots political
activity becomes imperative if we wish to enjoy a vital,
participatory democracy. If speech-the immediate target of
every oppressive regime-is muted, none of our other
cherished liberties ultimately can survive.
As the role of the constitutionally protected public forum
diminishes . . . other legal approaches to preserve an
endangered domain must be sought. The promise of
Pruneyard, which would have opened shopping malls to
political activity, has foundered on the reluctance of most
state courts to read their constitutions as providing access to
privately owned lands [(recall PruneYard is a minority
position)]. Speech advocates, therefore, must search
elsewhere to fuel their struggle. State common-law
limitations on property owners' powers and state regulatory
schemes calling for expressive access are two sources for the

struggle.'17
While Berger's ideas are well-argued, his position rather misses
the point. Without the most cherished protection of private property
and property rights, which occupy a paramount position in our legal,
philosophical, and political history, the "participatory democracy"
which Berger speaks of would be wholly lost. It can be argued that
democracy, without the classically liberal Anglo-American
pre-eminence of private property rights, can lead to the totalitarianism
and oppression that Berger warns against. 178 Property rights are at the
very foundation, literally, of limited government: one of the reasons
that the barons of England pressed for Magna Carta-the very basis
of limited government-was due to wrongs done to their property
(such as confiscations and extortions) by King John. 17 9 Again,
PruneYard and cases like it are the exception, rather than the rule.
80
Most states have not given as expansive speech rights as California.'
"Mall owners have prevailed [in protecting their property rights] in
Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York, North Carolina,

177Id.
78

at 690-9 1.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 22-27; Locke, supra note 15, at 53-54; SANDEFUJR,
supra note 15, at 22 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 27, at
329 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1963)); see also HAYEK, supra note 73.
79
1 Hinkle, supra note 46, at 267-68.
180 Berger, supra note 144, at 634.
1
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Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin but have lost in California,
8
Massachusetts, Washington, and Oregon."' '
Despite being in the minority camp concerning state constitutional
protection of political speech on private property, California, where
PruneYard originated, is a particularly important example for the
tension between expression rights and property rights for this Note
because of the state's economic significance in both the country and
the world.'182 Large dominant states like California often blaze the trail
for the nation in general-if not always with legal theory, certainly in
terms of economic models and, to some extent, social trends. Thus,
states like California, New York, Florida, or Texas may predict the
direction the country, in general, is heading. In the real estate
industry, planning concepts such as CIDs, and lifestyle centers may
often arrive first in the highly populated, economically vibrant, and
fast growing parts of the country. For example, California has
approximately 25,000 CIDs, the second most of any state (second to
Florida where there are approximately 40,000 CIDs).1 8 3 Also, both
California and Florida are the only states where the Community
Associations Institute has established permanent legislative action

committees.18
The California Court of Appeal used the same state constitutional
framework as PruneYard in Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain
Foundation,18' but also discussed and employed the state action
doctrine. In Laguna Publishing the HOA of the CID Leisure World
imposed a blanket ban on the distribution of one free newspaper,
while allowing the distribution of another.' 86 Leisure World is a gated
community where there is no general public invitation.' 8 ' The Court
of Appeal of California held that the banned newspaper was

181Id at 634 n. 10. However, Washington narrowed its state constitutional stance to only
requiring that owners allow solicitation of signatures for an initiative in Southeenter Joint
Venture v. National Democratic Policy Committee, 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1989). Id
State
Economy,
Analyst's
Office,
Cal
Facts 2004
182 See
Legislative
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2004/cal-facts/2004_-calfacts-econ.htmn (last visited Jan. 18, 2008). An
illustrative example is that in 2003 the economy of California was slightly larger than that of
Italy and slightly smaller than that of France. Id In 2004, our nation's second largest economy,
that of New York, was only 60 percent as large as California's economy. Id; see MCKENZIE,
supra note 8, at 153-54.
183MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 153-54.
1841d at 154. See generally Community Associations Institute, http://www.caionline.org/
(last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
185182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), see MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 158-60.
186 Laguna Publishing, 182 Cal. Rptr at 815.
187 Id See generally BARNET, PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 127, at 40-42 (using
Leisure World as an example of consent).
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discriminated against and was entitled to damages under Article 1,
section 2 of the California Constitution.' 8 8
Though the court ultimately decided the case based on a
discrimination doctrine, it also discussed the Marsh type of state
action. 189 In its discussion of Marsh, the court cited Van Nuys
Publishing Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks'90 to illustrate that an
ordinance restricting the unsolicited newspaper distribution to
residences of a municipality (the city of Thousand Oaks) was
unconstitutional. 9 1 This is analogous to the situation within Leisure
World to the extent that when a municipality restricted the same type
of activity that a HOA restricted in a CID, the municipal ordinance
was found to be unconstitutional. Thus, if the state action doctrine
was used to put the HOA in the shoes of the state, the CC&R
restricting newspaper distribution would be similarly circumspect.
The discussion in Laguna Publishing also implicated a type of
state action that is associated with Shelley v. Kraemer, 91 2 which is
typically referred to as the 'judicial enforcement" theory of state
action. 193 Although this theory is not as generally relevant to this
Note, 194 it deserves some comment. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court
held that when courts uphold racially restrictive covenants in deeds,
this public enforcement of a private agreement constitutes state
action 1 95 The decision in Laguna Publishing actually hinted at a
broader reading of Shelley v. Kraemer than that which is typical. The
Laguna Publishing court cites to the California Supreme Court case
Mulkey v. Reitman 196 to suggest that not only does judicial
enforcement of any discriminatory actions constitute state action, but
in fact aid by any state agency, department, or branch would
constitute state action.1 97
188 Laguna Publishing. 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36. The pertinent part of the section reads:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or
press." CAL. CONST. Art. 1, § 2.
189 Laguna Publishing, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25.
190 489 P.2d 809 (Cal. 197 1).
19 1Laguna Publishing, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 825. Compare 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (discriminatory
restriction on newspaper distribution), with City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994)
(ordinance restricting signs found to be unconstitutional).
192334 U.S. 1 (1948).
193Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 243.
19Se Laguna Publishing, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 828 (stating that the application of the
"judicial enforcement" theory is not limited to state action).
195Id.
196413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966) (describing how a defendant refused to rent an apartment on
the grounds of race and a state constitutional amendment prohibited laws against racial
discrimination
in housing), afd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
197
Laguna Publishing, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
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Because even the basic rationale, although not the result, in Shelley
v. Kraemer was, and continues to be, very controversial,198 Laguna
Publishing'sextension of Shelley's reasoning is quite a stretch. Most
shocking is that any attempt to enforce a private agreement--one
of the very roots of the common law' 9 9-would be viewed as state
action. This makes it quite impossible to distinguish between private
and public for the purposes of constitutional analysis .20 0 Nonetheless,
the Laguna Publishing court used both Marsh and Shelley v.
Kraemer to approach the situation as a hybrid case: a CID with
municipality-like characteristics, which employs a discriminatory
practice . 20 '1The court ultimately found that discrimination tipped the
scale, declaring the practice unconstitutional .2 02 However, by using
this rationale, the court both maintained the existing private property
regime and was inconclusive as to the issue of whether HOAs are
private governments, due to the use of both the Marsh and Shelley v.
Kraemer doctrines of state action.20
New Jersey courts, like those in California, have also used the state
constitution to recognize a more expansive protection of expressive
rights on private property0 and have followed the model California
set in PruneYard for shopping centers .205 The leading shopping center
case relating to protected expression on privately owned property in
Coalition Against War in the Middle East
New Jersey is New Jersey
20 6
Corp.
Realty
v. J.MB.
198 See Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 243; see also Shelly Ross Saxer, Shelley v.
Kraemer 's Fiftieth Anniversary. "A Time for Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away"?, 47 U.
KAN. L. REv. 61 (1998).
199The right to contract is at the very heart of common law and the Anglo-American legal
tradition. See, e.g., R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN
OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 151 (1985); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The
Magna Carta itself was an agreemeni between King John and the lords and barons of England.
See Hinkle, supra note 46, at 262. Thus, private agreement is at the very heart of limited
constitutional government and the common law-our law. In light of our proud and privileged
legal history, the extreme confusion of private and public that the Shelley v. Kraemer "judicial
enforcement" state action doctrine espouses is all the more circumspect.
m Chadderdon, supra note 11, at 244. There are compelling arguments that there are much
better ways to go about dealing with the situation than invoking state action, such as rights
balancing and legislative action. Saxer, supra note 198, at 62-63.
20
Laguna Publishing, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 828-29.
202

203
2

d

See MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 158-60.

04See, e.g., N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d
1994).
757 (N.J.
205
Id at 769. However, in a recently decided opinion, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
found that the community of Twin Rivers' CC&Rs restricting political expression did not
violate the state constitution. Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners'
Ass'n, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
206NJ. Coal, 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
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In New Jersey Coalition a group wanted to leaflet
privately-owned, (large) regional shopping centers. 0 The New Jersey
lower courts upheld the property rights of the shopping centers'
owners.208 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that parties
must have a right to petition societal issues at all regional shopping
centers, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 0
The court, inter alia, looked to the fact that large regional shopping
centers were the new functional equivalent of "downtown business

districts. 2 10 The court's holding relied in part on its decision in State
v. Schmid'2 1 1 where a member of the U.S. Labor Party212 was arrested
for criminal trespass at Princeton University for distributing political
material without a permit. 1 The Schmid court held that because the
private university did not have appropriate time, place, and manner
regulations regarding such speech, it could not bar such speech. 1
The court presumed that to accomplish the purpose of the private
institution (presumably 'academic inquiry,' or 'the expansion of
knowledge'), the university must allow uninvited political speech
subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 1
If one values the importance (both structurally and normatively) of
private land ownership and the property rights that flow from it in the
Anglo-American legal tradition, as well as the tradition of limited
constitutional government, then New Jersey Coalition and Schmid
seem all too troubling. An analogous situation would be if an
individual operated a private research foundation (partially funded
through public grants, which were not its primary source of
financing), the individual would have to allow uninvited political
solicitation on the property owned by the foundation-private
property. In essence, the court used a doctrine classically developed
to allow the government to put some restriction on expression in
Id. at 760.
205N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 628 A.2d 1075, 1076
207

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), rev'd, 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); N.J. Coal. Against War in
the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 628 A.2d 1094, 1099 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991),
affd, 628 A.2d 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), rev'd, 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
209N.J. Coal, 650 A.2d at 780-82.
2lO1d. at 768.
211423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
212Th U.S. Labor Party was the vehicle used by Lyndon LaRouche when he ran for
president in 1976. Paul L. Montgomery, One Man Leads U.S. Labor Party on Its Erratic Path,
N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 8, 1979, at Bl. This party is to be distinguished firom, and is unrelated to,
the current Labor Party that operates in the United States, which was founded in Cleveland,
Ohio by a number of labor unions in 1996. See Labor Party, Labor Party: About,
http://www.thelaborparty.org/a_index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
213
Schmid, 423 A.2d at 618.
214 Id. at 632-33.
215Id. at 630-3 1.
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actual public forums (time, place, and manner restrictions), 2 16 to force
private institutions to allow expression on their private property.
C Private PropertyRights Paramount,and Not Inconsistent with
Expression in the Public Sphere: The Road to Overruling PruneYard
Most recently, the California Supreme Court has upheld broad
expression rights on private property in Fashion Valley Mall, LLC
v. NLRB 2' 17 re-affirming PruneYard. In Fashion Valley the issue
was whether a mall restriction that prevented individuals from
encouraging customers to boycott certain stores in the mall (in other
words, strikers picketing) was constitutional under the California
Constitution. 1
Specifically, members of a local graphic
communications union were distributing leaflets to customers in front
of a Robinsons-May department store at the Fashion Valley mall in
San Diego. 21 9 The fact pattern of Fashion Valley is remarkably similar
to both Logan Valley and Hudgens; however, in Fashion Valley those
facts are applied to the more expansive protections under California
state law .220 In Fashion Valley the Supreme Court of California held
that a blanket rule that prohibits individuals from encouraging
customers to boycott stores (specifically leafleting) violates
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions for limiting speech
under the California Constitution . 22 1 The decision affirms
PruneYard222 and confirms the notion that the California Constitution
has more expansive protections for speech than the United States
Constitution. 2
However, the dissent makes an argument for overruling
PruneYard.2 The dissent notes the overwhelming rejection of
PruneYard in other states. 2 In fact, as mentioned above, only four
216

See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1983).
Fashion Valley, 172 P.3d 742 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 94 (2008).
218
1d. at 743-44.
219
217

Id.
5See Hudgens

220

v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens, 424 U.S.
507.221172 P.3d at 75 1. The mall's rule ran afoul of Article I, section 2, of the California
Constitution. Id at 743. See generally CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2. For reference purposes a boycott
is regarded as a type of expression that is typically protected under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Fashion Valley, 172 P.3d at 753. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. 1,XIV.
222172 P.3d at 749-50.
22
3Id. at 748-49. "Our decision that the California Constitution protects the right to free
speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not, stems from the
differences between the First Amendment to the federal Constitution and article 1, section 2 of
the California
Constitution." Id. at 749.
24
- Id. 754-5 5 (Chin, I., dissenting).
225

1d. at 757-59.
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states other than California accept the reasoning of PruneYard: New
Jersey, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Washington. 2
As a
counterexample, the Connecticut Supreme Court expressly rejected
PruneYard in United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local
919, AFL-CIO v. Crystal Mall Associates, L. p.227 and upheld a
restriction on speech in a shopping center--despite the fact that the
California and Connecticut Constitutions have nearly identical
provisions regarding speech. 2 Justice Chin, the dissenter in Fashion
Valley, cites the Crystal Mall court's explanation:
"[s]ince the decision in Cologne, courts in other jurisdictions
that have considered this issue overwhelmingly have chosen
not to interpret their state constitutions as requiring private
property owners, such as those who own large shopping
malls, to permit certain types of speech, even political speech,
on their premises." . . . "Under Cologne, as in the
overwhelming majority of our sister jurisdictions, the size of
the mall, the number of patrons it serves, and the fact that the
general public is invited to enter the mall free of charge do
not, even when considered together, advance the plaintiffs
2 29
cause in convertingprivate action into government action."

2261d at 758. Also, Colorado has actually recently weakened its stance. Id. at 759; see
Robertson v. Westminster Mall Co., 43 P.3d 622 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). It should be noted that
the four other outliers, while certainly not being economically insignificant, do not include
states that are more influential in the national economy, such as Texas, Florida, Illinois, and
especially New York, the state with the next largest economy after California (60 percent
that of California). Legislative Analyst's Office, Cal Facts 2004 State Economy,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2004/cal-facts/2004_calfacts-econ.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
227852 A.2d 659 (Conn. 2004) (finding that evidence did not lead to conclusion of state
action for disallowing union access to mall common areas to distribute literature to patrons
regarding legal rights of union employees).
22 Fashion Valley, 172 P.3d at 758 (Chin, J., dissenting).
229Id. (quoting Crystal Mall, 852 A.2d at 667, 673) (citations omitted) (first alteration in
original) (emphasis added). Cologne v. Westfarms Associates is an earlier Connecticut Supreme
Court case with facts analogous to PruneYard. Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 469 A.2d
1201 (Conn. 1984). Cologne was decided contrarily to PruneYard, although both were decided
in a post-Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner environment:

Although we are under no legal constraint to follow Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner,
we approve the rejection in that decision of such a claim as applied to a shopping
center: "Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is
generally invited to use it for designated purposes . . . . The essentially private
character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by
virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center."
Id. at 1210 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972)) (citation omitted)
(omission in original). It should be noted that the language of the court in Crystal Mall actually
also applies to the facts and reasoning of New Jersey Coalition.
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Justice Chin's Fashion Valley dissent agrees with the reasoning of
Lloyd Corp., stating that a shopping mall is hardly a company town
that performs nearly all the functions of the state.2 30 As an important
philosophical and doctrinal point, the dissent points out that allowing
restrictions of speech on private property does not have to be
conceptually inconsistent with promoting the freedom of speech:
I do not denigratefree speech rights. As the New York Court
of Appeal stated in its opinion rejecting Pruneyard[sic], "the
right to free expression is one of this Nation's most
cherished civil liberties." But free speech rights and private
property rights can and should coexist. The last 30 years have
not seen a significant diminution of free speech opportunities
in the many jurisdictions that have followed the high court's
lead regarding private property. The Union here is not
without recourse if it wants to urge a lawful boycott of any
business or engage in any other protected freedom of
expression. It has plenty of outlets to exercise its free speech
rights. If it wants to picket, it simply has to do so on public
property or seek permission from private property owners.
The Union can exercise its free speech rights, for example,
just outside the shopping center, including near the entrances
. .. especially today with the advent of the Internet and other
forms of mass communication. .... But I wouldfind no right
to engage in speech activity on private property over the
owner's objection.2 3
Justice Chin goes on to point out that, even if expression and speech
rights do exist in shopping centers, shopping centers are still not
quintessential public forums, like "Hyde Park in London . .. or the
2 2
National Mall in Washington, D.C., 1

Consequently, in this recent case, cracks may be forming in the
case law of California, the stalwart of state constitutional expression
rights on private property. The dissent in Fashion Valley gives
compelling justification for overruling PruneYard. Protecting the
property rights of owners of private property does not need to be
fundamentally inconsistent with a culture of allowing expression on
public property, in legitimate public forums. I would add that the
230 Fashion Valley, 172 P.3d at 758-60 (Chin, J., dissenting).
231Id at 760 (quoting SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1212 (N.Y.
1985)) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263-68
(Cal. 2002) (Chin, J., dissenting).
232Fashion Valley, 172 P.3d at 760 (Chin, J., dissenting).
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reasoning of Justice Chin's dissent (and the authority he cites)
becomes all the more compelling given the historic, jurisprudential,
and philosophical importance of the protection of private property
rights.
D. State CorporationLaws: An Alternative to State Action?
Courts have also used state corporation law and doctrines relating
to businesses as a vehicle by which to hold HOAs to the standard of
233
public governments. In Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Association,
the California Court of Appeal applied corporate fiduciary duty
doctrine-a private right-to hold the HOA to the same standard as a
municipality using an analogy to public governments and the rights
and expectations inherent therein. 3 The court stated that "'like any
government, the Association must balance individual interests against

the general welfare."'

23 5

Also, in O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association2 36 a
couple had a baby boy, violating a CC&R restricting persons under
the age of eighteen from living in the CID.2 3 In its holding, the
Supreme Court of California found the HOA to be operating a
"business establishment" as applied in the Unruh Civil Rights Act of
California. 3 The pertinent part of the Unruh Civil Rights Act
(Section 51 of the California Civil Code), entitling all people in
the jurisdiction to full and equal use of accommodations, reads
that people shall be free "from arbitrary discrimination in
'accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever."'2Q39 The O'Connor
holding meant that the HOA would have to allow children to live in
the CID, discarding the benefit that added to their personal utility
maximization, which they had bargained for .240 However, in response
to O'Connor, the California legislature exempted age restrictions in
CIDs from similar regulation one year later in 1984.4
233 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Ct. App. 1983) (regarding a dispute over CC&Rs relating to a fence
that blocked the plaintiffs view).
234Id. at 214 (citing Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the
Development and Administration of Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 915 (1976)); see MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 160.
235 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 160 (quoting Cohen, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 215).
236 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983).

237Id

at 428.

238Id.

at 429.; see CAL. CIV. CODE ANN.

23

ANN.

§ 51

(West 2007).

0O'Connor, 662 P.2d at 430 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51); see

§ 51.
240Se COOTER & ULEN, supra note
241MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 161.

16, at 23-26.
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Another interesting decision relating to the entity status of HOAs
is Frances T v. Village Green Owners Association, 4 where a
resident of a condominium sued the HOA after being attacked in
her condominium unit. 243 The court viewed the situation like a
landlord-tenant as well as a corporate fiduciary relationship for the
purposes of the duty of care, thereby allowing suits to be filed against
HOA directors for breach of fiduciary duty.2
Opening up this type of potential tort liability to HOA directors
(some of whom are management executives, but some of whom
are simply residents) was viewed as particularly unwelcome by
HOAs. 245 Notwithstanding the issue of possible inexperience of
resident-directors, the budgets of many HOAs may not allow room
for director and officer ("D&O") insurance; in addition, if the HOAs
were forced to buy D&O insurance, this would necessitate an increase
in HOA fees required to cover the newly increased costs to the
HOAs.2 4 Partly in response to these concerns, the California state
legislature passed legislation limiting the tort liability of HOA
directors.2 4
This is particularly interesting because this type of
statutorily-limited liability, or "sovereign immunity," resembles the
limits imposed on the liability of municipal officials.2 4 In an attempt
to preserve the freedom of action of HOA directors and protect them
from broad tort liability, the California legislature actually may have
provided further evidence that CIDs are the functional equivalents to
municipalities in that their officials are treated similarly regarding tort
liability. Along similar lines is the private association theory of
Richard Eells and Clarence Walton, which claims that large
corporations act like governments toward their employees and have
ties to public governments to the extent of being agents of the
government .249 This is certainly an outlier opinion, especially in
242 723

P.2d 573 (Cal. 1986); see MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 162.
Frances T, 723 P.2d at 574.
244Id at 576-77, 587; see MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 162.
243

245
24

See

MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 162.

See Low, supra note 2, at 177-78 (HOA operating budgets).
247 MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 162.
248 Id
249
RiCHAPJ) EELLS & CLARENCE WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS
134-35, 142 (1961); MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 124-25. The theory goes on to state that
corporations act in a much more undemocratic fashion than public governments--consequently
the theory argues that corporations should be more "socially responsible." EELLS & WALTON,
supra, at 134-35; MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 125. Compare EELLS & WALTON, supra, at 13435, 142 (regarding corporations in general), with Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr.
209, 214-15 (CtL App. 1983) (suggesting that HOAs are lie governments and should act more
socially responsible, in the way governments do). Contra FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 135-36.
6
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regard to agency, but an interesting extension of the comparison
between public and private "governments."
Our modem theory of the corporation began with the corporation
as a concession of the state-to do business for the state-during the
age of mercantilism. 25 0 The earliest examples were Crown-chartered
joint-stock companies, such as the British East India Company that
was chartered in 1600 .25 1 This concession theory was embodied in
Chief Justice Marshal's words from Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward2
[a corporation is] an artificial being, invisible,
intangible and existing only in contemplation of law.", 2 53 However,
this is far from the prevailing theory of the corporation today. The
corporation, as a private contractual organization, has its roots in the
freedom of association, the specifics of which can often be altered
from the default rules in state corporation statutes. 5 As Eells and
Walton themselves have said: "'.men [have] formed such bodies
without the sanction of a sovereign as far back as we can trace
business activity under modem conditions.' . . .[There is the]
'historic practice of men in a free society to organize voluntarily for
the pursuit of common purposes--quite independent of state
action."' 255 Despite the private association theory that suggests large
corporations are agents of the sovereign, the above quote drives to the
heart of classical liberal notions. Consequently, I believe it to be
fundamentally inappropriate to use the corporation, one of the
primary vehicles of private wealth creation and economic
efficiencynot to mention an integral part of our free-market system, to
effectuate the public ordering of HOAs.25
E. Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers
Homeowners' Association: Consent, Waiver, and the
Protectionof PrivateProperty Rights, the Right to Contract, and
PersonalChoice
The recently decided New Jersey case Committee for a Better
Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Association27proie
promising glimpse of the possibility that the efforts to treat HOAs as
250

MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 124.

251

1Id.

252 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
253MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 124 (quoting Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4

Wheat.) at 636).
25

2 5
256

MCKENZIE, supra note 8, at 124.

Id (quoting EELLS & WALTON, supra note 249, at 134-35, 142).

See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 58.

257929

A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
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state actors (effectuating the public ordering of HOAs) may be losing
ground. Twin Rivers dealt with CC&Rs restricting signposting,
common room use, and community newspaper access in a contest for
control of the HOA that managed Twin Rivers.25 Twin Rivers, which
is located in East Windsor, New Jersey, is a mixed-use
CID consisting of condominiums (duplexes, townhouses, and
2 59
single-family homes), apartments, and commercial buildings.
A lower court, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court held in part that the dissidents' "right[] to engage in expressive
exercises[,] including those relating to public issues in their own
community, such as with regard to the election of candidates to the
[HOA b]oard, or broader issues of governmental and public policy
consequence, . . . must take precedence over the [HOA's] private
property interests. 6
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this holding and
began its opinion with the proposition that despite the fact that the
citizens of New Jersey possess speech and assembly rights under the
state constitution, these rights are not absolute and can be waived or
otherwise curtailed through private arrangement .2 6 1 The court viewed
this case as a hybrid of both New Jersey Coalition and Schmid. 6
However, despite the fact that the court used its precedent from New
Jersey Coalition and Schmid, it held in Twin Rivers that the HOA
restrictions do not violate the state constitution due to the fact that
through private arrangements citizens can change what their rights
would have been in the public sphere .263 Using a three-factor test
from Schmid, the court ascertained that the primary purpose of the
CID was for private residential use, that there was no general public
invitation onto the CID, and that the group seeking political
expression (through political signs, etc.) was not unduly restricted .2 64
The last factor in the Schmid test is essentially a "fairness" standard,
which looks at the restriction in relation to the type of expression

sought.265

The most important aspect of Twin Rivers is that the court accepts
the notion that through private ordering-namely consent and waiver
2

58M. at 1064-65.

259MId at

1063.
Comm. for a Better Twin Rivera v. Twin Rivers Homeowners' Ass'n, 890 A.2d 947,
959 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007).
261 929 A.2d at 1063.
262Id; see N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d
757 (N.J. 1994); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
263 Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1063.
260

2

64Id
26

5 Id.

at 1072-73.

2009]

REG ULA TION OF COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS53
533

through the CC&Rs-the CID residents cannot expect to have the
same rights they would be guaranteed under the state constitution if
they were living in a municipality. 6 From this one could even
interpret that if a CID were to have a blanket restriction on traditional
2 67
forms of expression, the CC&Rs would not be "unconstitutional.
The court stated "that plaintiffs' expressional [sic] activities are not
unreasonably restricted. As the [HOA] points out, the relationship
between it and the homeowners is a contractual one, formalized in
reasonable covenants that appear in all deeds." 6 In doing this, the
court distinguishes Schmid, where academic discourse and the search
for knowledge needed to be facilitated, and New Jersey Coalition,
where the protection of the "new town square" needed to be
maintained (even if the town square was now privately owned and
took on all the characteristics of private property while allowing
public invitees). 6
Notwithstanding the fact that a private university, shopping center,
and residential CID are all different types of private property, this
seems to be a distinction without a difference. The fact remains that
each is private property where there is some degree of public
invitation (Twin Rivers was not gated 27 1). To borrow the metaphor of
Justice Chin, Princeton University and a privately-owned large
shopping center are hardly Hyde Park, with its multitude of soap
boxes and impassioned orators. 7 It is difficult to see the distinction
between privately-owned shopping centers on the one hand, and
un-gated CIDs with businesses inside on the other.
The court in Twin Rivers did emphasize the necessity of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions for the political
expression in Twin Rivers.2 7 For example, the CC&Rs in Twin
Rivers did allow for political signs to be placed one per window and
in flower beds adjacent to units (presumably not to interfere with
lawn mowing). Also, political gatherings were permitted in residents'
private units. 7
These are certainly reasonable restrictions.
However, the court goes on to make a statement that would even

266ld. at 1074.
267
See id
268Id. at 1073.
269

Id

2701d. at 1073.
27Se Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 760 (Cal. 2007) (Chin, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 94 (2008).
272Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1074. See generally United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 17 1,
180-81 (1983) (regarding time, place, and manner).
273Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1073-74.
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apply to CIDs that have blanket restrictions on signage or other types

of political expression 24
Plaintiffs can walk through the neighborhood, ring the
doorbells of their neighbors, and advance their views....
[Also, a]s members of the [H40A], plaintiffs can vote, run for
office, and participate through the elective process in the
decision-making of the [HOA]. Thus, plaintiffs may seek to
garner a majority to change the rules and regulations to
reduce or eliminate the restrictions they now challenge. 7
Thus, even in the most restrictive CIDs, the residents are not forced to
be mute, nor are they immobile subjects of a totalitarian regime
trapped behind the Iron Curtain, despite the resemblance of some CID
gatehouses to Checkpoint Charlie.
CONCLUSION

Therefore, in light of classically liberal notions of property rights,
and the economic efficiency and market advantages of the private
ordering of CIDs, both to individuals and to society at large, I
advocate for the continued private ordering of HOAs through
CC&Rs. HOAs have come under attack for their restriction of
political expression, and some have called for HOAs to be treated as
state actors or regulated through public law by various means, most
notably the state action doctrine. However, despite these assertions, I
maintain that the most efficient and just strategy for the regulation of
HOAs is to continue to use a system of private ordering by way of
CC&Rs-schemes of contracts, HOA regulations, equitable
servitudes, and real covenants-as opposed to a public or
constitutional framework.
S. COLIN G. PETRYt
274Even if a CID banned all political gathering in common areas, presumably one could
always have a gathering in his unit. However, one may not be able to advertise through
leafleting.
275 Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d at 1074. Further, "every man may justly consider his home his
castle and himself as the king thereof-, nonetheless his sovereign flat to use his property as he
pleases must yield, at least in degree, where ownership is in common or cooperation with
others." Sterling Vill. Condo., Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971), cited in Cara L. Thomas, Butt Out! Controlling Environmental Tobacco Smoke in
Condominiums, PROB. & PROP. MAG., May/June 2008, at 11, 17.
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